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CASE NOTES
the denial of bail pending appeal in the Campbell case was a proper exer-
cise of the court's discretion. However, a court in exercising its discretion
under Rule 46 (a) (2) in narcotic cases should carefully consider the fac-
tual situation in each case. Perhaps more leniency should be exercised in
the case of first offenders than in the case of second offenders. Moreover,
bail should never be denied for the purpose of punishment, since the
judgment of conviction cannot be executed while the matter is stayed
pending appeal. 19
19 Cf. Reynolds v. United States, 80 S.Ct. 30 (1959).
LABOR LAW-BUSINESS HOURS NOT PROPER SUBJECT
FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Jewel Tea Co. filed suit against Locals 189, 262, 320, 546, 547, 571 and
638 of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North
America AFL-CIO, and several officials of the union, alleging a violation
of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.' The complaint alleged
that the defendants had engaged in an unlawful combination and con-
spiracy to suppress competition among retail meat markets in the Chicago
area and to prevent all sale of meats and meat products before 9 a.m. or
after 6 p.m. It was pleaded that under compulsion of the alleged conspir-
acy and the threat of strike by the unions, the plaintiff was forced to sign
contracts with the defendant unions containing, among other things, a
restriction that market operating hours shall be 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
Monday through Saturday, inclusive. No customer coming into the mar-
ket before or after said hours would be served. The operation of the
agreements has enabled Associated Food Retailers of Greater Chicago,
Inc., a major competitor, to remain closed after 6 p.m. without fear of
losing trade to plaintiff, because of evening sales, and also to avoid the
added expense of remaining open during the evening. Jewel Tea Co. v.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters, No. 12653 (C.A.7th, 1960).
The defendants appealed from orders by the United States District
Court denying their motion to dismiss the complaint; the court of appeals
affirmed the district court's orders and remanded the suit to the district
court for determination of the amount of damages. Certiorari was denied
by the Supreme Court of the United States. Docket No. 732 (March 28,
1960). 28 Law Week 3283.
While Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act prohibit any contract or
conspiracy in restraint of trade, such anti-trust legislation is not applicable
1 Also named as defendants, but not parties to the appeal, are Associated Food Re-
tailers of Greater Chicago, Inc., a not-for-profit trade association representing several
thousand individual or independent food stores engaged in the retail sale of meat in the
Greater Chicago area, and the secretary-treasurer of said association.
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to labor organizations while they are carrying out their legitimate objec-
tives.2 Since a labor union may be exempt from the antitrust laws while a
non-labor group such as Associated Food Retailers of Greater Chicago, a
defendant herein, is not shielded therefrom, "what is the result if the two
conspire?" In Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, I.B.E.W.,3 the
Court said: "Congress never intended that unions could, consistently with
the Sherman Act, aid non-labor groups to create business monopolies and
to control the marketing of goods and services.' 4 In the same opinion the
court also stated: "Our holding means that the same labor union activi-
ties may or may not be in violation of the Sherman Act, dependent upon
whether the union acts alone or in combination with business groups."5
The application of the Bradley case to Jewel obviously brands the de-
fendant unions' agreement with the defendant trade association (a non-
labor organization) as a violation of the anti-trust laws.
Another question to be considered is whether the agreement regulating
market operating hours, entered into between the defendant unions and the
plaintiff, Jewel Tea Co., constitutes carrying out the legitimate objectives
of a labor union, and is, therefore, an activity shielded from the anti-trust
laws. In other words: "does a labor representative have any right to a
voice in the determination of market operating hours?" The court of ap-
peals in the Jewel case decided this determination was solely a function
of the employer. The court stated:
An employer has the right and it is his duty, if he is to survive commercially,
first to determine the needs of the public, second to provide a time, a place
and facilities for meeting those needs, and third to provide, under the terms
of the National Labor Relations Act, the services of the employees to accom-
plish the foregoing objectives. The right of labor attaches only to the third,
and if any effort is made by labor to infringe rights of the employer in the
first or second field, it is not shielded from the sword of the antitrust laws.
Determining the needs of the public and meeting those needs are inherent
proprietary rights and obligations of the employer and must be clearly dis-
tinguished from his rights and duties as master in the master servant relationship.
Setting marketing hours is one such proprietary function which an employer
has the exclusive right to determine as dictated by economic factors present
within his trading area.6
As the foregoing statement by the court of appeals illustrates, an em-
ployer need not discuss every facet of the company's business with its em-
2 15 U.S.C.. §5 1, 2, 17 (Supp., 1959); United States v. Chattanooga Chapter National
Elec. Contractors Ass'n., 116 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Tenn., 1953).
3 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
4 Ibid., at 808.
5 Ibid., at 810.
6 Jewel Tea Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, No. 12653 (C.A.7th, 1960) at 4, 5.
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ployees or their representatives. 7 However, there is no general rule as to
where the line is to be drawn. This is illustrated by Cross & Co. v. N.L.R.B.8
where the court said it was impossible "to enunciate a generalizing prin-
ciple for the decision of future cases, [because] generalization must a'wait
the accumulation of a body of decided cases pricking out the line be-
tveen subject matters within the Act [N.L.R.A.] and subject matters
outside its scope . ". ."9
In the jewel case, the decision of the court of appeals seems to be a
short sighted view of what constitutes subject matter required to be sub-
mitted to collective bargaining within the scope of the N.L.R.A.10 The
cases are in accord that, "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment,"" is the language in the statute which
defines the matters which the employer is required to submit to collec-
tive bargaining. 12 The query is: "What does the statutory language em-
brace?"
Disputes which were the traditional subject matter of collective bar-
gaining such as the settlement of wages,'8 shorter hours, 14 and vacation
periods,15 are unquestionably included within the statute. However, the
scope of the statute has not been limited merely to traditional subjects of
collective bargaining. Matters which are now held to be within the scope
of the N.L.R.A., requiring collective bargaining, were felt, at one time,
to be absolute proprietary rights subject solely to the discretion of the
employer. Some of these matters are: Retirement and pension plans,16
7 A refusal to bargain about legislative policies and other generalities is not to be
forbidden within the provisions of the N.L.R.A. Globe Cotton Mills v. N.L.R.B.,
103 F.2d 91 (C.C.A.5th, 1939).
8 174 F.2d 875 (C.A.lst, 1949).
9 Ibid., at 878 (emphasis supplied).
10 It is lawful to insist matters within the scope of the N.L.R.A. be submitted to col-
lective bargaining and unlawful to insist upon submission of matters outside the scope
thereof. N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
11 N.L.R.A. §§ 8(a) (5), 9(a); 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 158(a) (5), 159(a) (Supp., 1959).
12 Cross & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 174 F.2d 875 (C.A.Ist, 1949); Inland Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
170 F.2d 247 (C.A.7th, 1948), cert. den. 336 U.S. 960 (1949); N.L.R.B. v. Barrett Co.,
135 F.2d 959 (C.C.A.7th, 1943); N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676
(C.C.A.9th, 1943); Wilson & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 115 F.2d 759 (C.C.A.Sth, 1940).
13 Singer Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 119 F.2d 131 (C.C.A.7th, 1941), cert. den. 313 U.S. 595
(1941).
14 N.L.R.B. v. Pilling & Son, 119 F.2d 32 (C.C.A.3d, 1941).
15 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
16 Inland Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B., 170 F.2d 247 (C.A.7th, 1948), cert. den. 336 U.S. 960
(1949).
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provisions for in-plant feeding,'7 group insurance,' 8 medical and hospital
fund,'0 bonuses,20 and the subcontracting of work.2' The contention that
the scope encompassed only those matters which were the subject of col-
lective bargaining as of the date of the adoption of the Act has been
rejected.22
What has caused this flexible translation of the scope of the Act? Hav-
ing fulfilled the bare objectives of reasonable hours and adequate wage,
plus healthy working conditions, unions have, in recent years, been di-
recting their efforts to matters which are not within the confined literal
translation of "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other con-
ditions of employment." Naturally, such efforts are being met with the
contention that these areas represent matters of management prerogative
and are not within the scope of the National Labor Relations Act.
Faced with this management resistance, the unions have emphasized the
effect that the matter in dispute would have upon the general welfare of
all the employees as a class, rather than attempting to categorically assert:
"this is a matter affecting wages," or "this is included within hours of
employment." In Wilson & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 23 the court said:
It [N.L.R.A.] obligates the employer to bargain in good faith both collec-
tively and exclusively with the chosen representative of a majority of his
employees with respect to all matters which affect his employees as a class,
including wages, hours of employment, and working conditions.2 4
In Carlisle v. Jacquelin,25 after specifying a list of proper subjects which
were subject to collective bargaining, it was added:
[A]nd all other matters of employee welfare which are, or normally would
be, the fruit of the Company's general personnel policy, applicable to all its
employees as such, and all of which are fairly comprehended within the term
"conditions of employment," within the meaning of the Act.20
'7 Ibid.
18 Cross & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 174 F.2d 875 (C.A.lst, 1949).
19 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
2 Singer Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 595 (1941).
21Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946). The Board's order was denied
enforcement on other grounds, Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 161 F.2d 949
(C.C.A.6th, 1947).
22 Cross & Co. v. N.L.R.B., 174 F.2d 875 (C.A.lst, 1949).
2a 115 F.2d 759 (C.C.A.Sth, 1940).
24 1bid., at 763 (emphasis supplied). Accord: N.L.R.B. v. Barrett Co., 135 F.2d 959
(C.C.A.7th, 1943); N.L.R.B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676 (C.C.A.9th,
1943).
2555 N.L.R.B. 678 (1944).
26 Ibid., at 682.
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As can readily be seen, the wording of the statute in question has at
least in some instances been given a flexible translation. In the present case
the court of appeals gave it a limited interpretation by holding that mar-
ket operating hours is solely a proprietary right which may only "inci-
dentally affect" a firm's employees.
Although in denying certiorari, the Supreme Court did not pass on the
question, an inference arises that the Supreme Court did not strongly dis-
approve of the decision of the court of appeals.
TORTS-FRAUD ACTION NOT ASSIGNABLE TO
TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
In October 1956, a creditor obtained judgment against one LaVoy and
a writ of execution was placed in the hands of deputy sheriff Hicks of
Ingham County, Michigan. Execution was levied on LaVoy's Ford pick-
up truck, which was duly advertised for sale. At the time of the execution
sale, the truck was worth approximately $1,100.00, but was actually sold
for only $375.00. The sale was made by an agent, acting for an undis-
closed principal who was, in fact, deputy sheriff Hicks. Shortly there-
after LaVoy filed in bankruptcy and the trustee in bankruptcy brought an
action for fraud against deputy sheriff Hicks, joining Hicks' statutory
surety as a co-defendant to the action. In his declaration, plaintiff-trustee
formally elected to affirm the voidable contract resulting from the fraud-
ulent execution sale, and seek the quintuple damages provided for in such
cases by Michigan statute.' Defendant's motion to dismiss was granted on
the grounds that the trustee could bring only the bankrupt's action of
fraud as assignee and that such an action was non-assignable. The Supreme
Court of Michigan affirmed the lower court, holding that an action of
fraud is not assignable in spite of the fact that it arises out of a tangible
property right. Jones v. Hicks, 100 N.W. 2d 243 (Mich., 1960).
Section 70 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act makes the following provi-
sion for devolution of title to a bankrupt's property:
(a) The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt ... shall. . . be vested by operation
of law with the title of the bankrupt . . . to all of the following kinds of
property wherever located . . . (5) property, including rights of action, which
I Mich. C.L. 1948, § 623.148 provides: "The officer who shall make any sale on execu-
tion, shall, in his return on the execution, specify the articles sold, and the sum for
which each article or parcel was sold; and if he shall be guilty of any fraud in the
sale, or in the return, or shall unreasonably neglect to pay any money collected by
him on such execution, when demanded by the creditor therein, he shall be liable to an
action on the case, at the suit of the party injured, for five (5) times the amount of
the actual damages sustained by reason of such fraud or neglect."
